This study seeks to quantify determinants, and costs, of the labor­force participation of married women. We use demographic and earnings data from the Health and Retirement Study. The earnings data constitute an unusually long panel but have the defect of lacking corresponding reports on work hours. By using a highly structured model and concentrating on the participation margin, we nevertheless feel that we can make substantial progress. Our preliminary regression results imply that married women’s market work disrupts their household consumption slightly less than one half as much as men’s work (relative to complete household retirement). We lay out a course of additional steps that can, we believe, clarify these results even more precisely in the near future. by Christopher House et al.
     Working Paper 
             
        WP 2007-171 
 








Trends in the Labor Force Participation of 
Married Women 
















University of Michigan 
 
John Laitner 
University of Michigan 
 
Dmitriy Stolyarov 







Michigan Retirement Research Center 
University of Michigan 
P.O. Box 1248 








This work was supported by a grant from the Social Security Administration through the 
Michigan Retirement Research Center (Grant # 10-P-98362-5-04).  The findings and 
conclusions expressed are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the 
Social Security Administration, any agency of the Federal government, or the Michigan 
Retirement Research Center.   
 
Regents of the University of Michigan 
Julia Donovan Darrow, Ann Arbor; Laurence B. Deitch, Bingham Farms; Olivia P. Maynard, Goodrich; 
Rebecca McGowan, Ann Arbor; Andrea Fischer Newman, Ann Arbor; Andrew C. Richner, Grosse Pointe 
Park; S. Martin Taylor, Gross Pointe Farms; Katherine E. White, Ann Arbor; Mary Sue Coleman, ex 
officio  
 
Trends in the Labor Force Participation of Married Women 
 
 







This study seeks to quantify determinants, and costs, of the labor—force participation of 
married women. We use demographic and earnings data from the Health and Retirement 
Study. The earnings data constitute an unusually long panel but have the defect of lacking 
corresponding reports on work hours. By using a highly structured model and 
concentrating on the participation margin, we nevertheless feel that we can make 
substantial progress. Our preliminary regression results imply that married women’s 
market work disrupts their household consumption slightly less than one half as much as 
men’s work (relative to complete household retirement). We lay out a course of 









This paper is preliminary and should not be cited without permission of the authors. This 
work was supported by a grant from the Social Security Administration through the 
Michigan Retirement Research Center (Grant # 10-P-98362-5). The opinions and 
conclusions are solely those of the authors and should not be considered as representing 






 Trends in the Labor Force Participation of Married Women
1. Introduction
The purpose of this study is to quantify the determinants of female labor—force par-
ticipation. Our focus is married women. Our approach is to analyze jointly households’
consumption—saving choices and the participation decisions of married women. We con-
struct a model that can predict the time path of female labor—force participation given
data on children, age, retirement, and earnings. The model allows us to utilize data from
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) (a) to estimate the relative importance of dif-
ferent factors that aﬀect female labor supply, (b) to compare extensive—margin costs of
participating in the labor market with intensive—margin costs of how many hours to work
conditional on participating at all, and (c) to estimate the direct implicit costs associated
with married women’s labor supply. We believe that understanding alterations in female
labor supply over the past ﬁfty years, and predicting developments that may yet come, is
of crucial importance both for anticipating consequences to large programs, such as Social
Security, and for keeping economic modeling in touch with some of the most signiﬁcant
changes in the U.S. economy in recent history.
The HRS is a rich source of data on men and women’s annual earnings as well as
their retirement ages, family demographic variables, and retirement—age net worth. The
HRS lacks, however, detailed data on hours worked at most ages. On the other hand, it
can provide fairly comprehensive informationo nw h i c hy e a r saw o m a nw o r k e di nt h el a b o r
force and which years she did not. By organizing our analysis around a very structured
life—cycle model, this paper attempts to makee x t e n s i v eu s eo ft h ed a t at h a ti sa v a i l a b l e .
Although this paper represents a preliminary report, we have non—linear least squares
estimates showing that households oﬀset married women’s labor—force participation with
annual increases of consumption expenditure of about 8 percent. In comparison, fully
retired couples seem to decrease their consumption expenditures about 20 percent relative
to ages when the male alone worked. Thus, according to one metric, married women’s
labor—force participation seems to be slightly less than half as disruptive to households as
having the male participate (rather than be retired). Other parameter estimates in this
paper imply an intertemporal rate of substitution in consumption of about 0.25. That is
well within the conventional range, though our procedure is suﬃciently nonstandard that
our outcomes may constitute independent conﬁrmation.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3
outlines our estimation strategy. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 presents our
results. Section 6 discusses an extension to simultaneous consideration of male retirement
and female labor—force participation at all ages. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Model
Our model analyzes married households’ decisions of how to allocate women’s time
between home production and market work, how to allocate lifetime resources over con-
sumption at diﬀerent ages, and when to retire. At this point, our empirical work (see
Sections 4-5) focuses exclusively on women’s time allocations – speciﬁcally, on women’s
1year—by—year decisions of whether or not to enter the labor force. Section 6 notes several
of the model’s implications for retirement – though only from a theoretical standpoint.
We assume that households take prices, wages, and interest rates as given. Prices
clear markets, so there is never quantity rationing. Time is continuous, and there is
no uncertainty. Households derive utility from a ﬁnal—consumption aggregate. The ﬁnal—
consumption aggregate depends on a combination of consumption of market goods, leisure,
and home production. Let cis denote household i’s quantity of consumption of the market
good at age s. Normalize the price of the market good to 1 at all times. Then we
assume that the ﬂow of utility that household i enjoys at age s depends on λis ·cis,w h e r e
the multiplicative factor λis, which can vary over time and across households, reﬂects the
ability of household i to enjoy market consumption and depends upon its concurrent leisure
and home production. Speciﬁcally, we assume that household i derives more utility from
a given amount of market consumption when its husband and wife can spend more time
in leisure and home production. Thus, the household enjoys a higher λis if the husband
is retired and/or if the wife does not participate in the labor market. As a matter of
deﬁnition, set λis = 1 when both the husband and wife participate in the labor force.
Then we set λis = λ > 1 when the husband alone participates in the labor force; and, we
set λis = Λ > λ when neither the husband nor the wife participates in the labor force. For
simplicity, we assume that an adult of either sex participates at any age in the labor force
full time or not at all, that men participate untilt h e yr e t i r e( a n ds u b s e q u e n t l yn o ta ta l l ) ,
and that wives stop participating when their husband retires – if not before.
Consider a household i that lives from age Si to Ti. For simplicity, the household’s age
is its husband’s age. Also for simplicity, the interest rate, r, is constant. The household
includes a man, a woman, and, possibly, children. The size of the household at age s is
Nis “equivalent adults” (see, for example, Tobin [1967]). The man and woman both retire
when the household reaches age Ri, though, as stated, the woman may have stopped her
market—work career earlier. At its inception, a household chooses its life—cycle expenditure
proﬁle on market consumption goods, cis;i t sr e t i r e m e n ta g e ,Ri; and the woman’s labor
force participation proﬁle pis ∈ {0, 1}. The notation is pis = 0 at age s if the woman is
not participating in the labor force, and pis = 1 if she is. As stated, we assume pis =0f o r
all ages s ≥ Ri. The household’s state variables are its age and its asset level, ais.
To optimize, household i solves
U(Si ,T i)= m a x
cis ,p is ,R i
8 Ri
Si




ds + V (Ri ,T i ,a iRi), (1)
subject to: ˙ ais = r · ais + yM
is + pis · yF
is − cis ,
ai0 =0,
where
λis = λ(s,p is) ≡
lλ, if s ≤ Ri ,p is =0,
1, if s ≤ Ri ,p is =1,
Λ, if s>R i ,
(2)
2and









subject to: ˙ ais = r · ais − cis ,
aiR = A,
ai,T i ≥ 0.
Expression (2) captures the change in the value of purchased consumption, cis,w i t h
changes in household labor—market participation. We assume that the ﬂow utility function




, γ > 0.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal expenditure path for each house-
hold’s consumption.
Proposition 1. Let (cis ,p is ,R i) be the optimal solution to the household problem. Let
Yis be the present value of lifetime earnings of household i measured at age s, so that for










γ · e(σ+r)·s , (3)
where σ ≡− r +
r−ρ
γ .
Appendix A supplies a proof.
Proposition 1 shows that optimal expenditure on consumption per equivalent adult
is piecewise exponential, with discontinuities at times when λis and/or Nis change due to
participation or retirement status changes or to changes in household composition.
Note that consumption cis will change discontinuously when participation or family








γ −1 , (4)
where the notation s+0ors−0 denotes points in time arbitrarily after or before s.W h e n
λis rises from retirement or cessation of female labor—force participation, expenditure per
adult equivalent decreases (increases) provided γ > 1( γ < 1). The intuition is as follows.




3over its lifetime, yet consumption yields the highest payoﬀ when λis is high. If γ < 1,
the desire to smooth is relatively weak (indeed, it disappears entirely when γ =0 ) .T h e n
complementarity with high λis predominates. In this case, a household chooses a high cis
for ages with high λis. On the other hand, if γ > 1, the desire to smooth is suﬃciently
powerful to predominate. In this case, a household intertemporally equalizes its marginal
utility by choosing a low cis at ages when λis is high.1
Most empirical studies of consumption behavior favor an intertemporal elasticity of
substitution less than 1 – in other words, a value γ > 1. As we have just seen, that
range implies that households will tend to reduce their consumption expenditure upon
retirement – which accords well with a number of recent studies.2 The same logic implies
that when a woman joins the labor force, causing her household’s λis to fall from λ to 1,
her household’s optimalm a r k e te x p e n d i t u r ecis should rise in compensation.
Labor—force participation increases a household’s ﬁnancial resources. That, in turn,
reduces the household’s overall marginal utility of spending on market consumption goods.
And, during periods of labor—force participation, a household sacriﬁces eﬃciency in pro-
ducing ﬁnal—good aggregate. The following proposition derives the marginal condition for
optimal participation that captures the tradeoﬀ.
Proposition 2. Let (cis ,p is) be the optimal solution to the household problem given Ri.
Then
pis =1 iﬀ yF
is − Nis ·
J Yi0
$ T









γ − 1] ≥ 0, (5)
where σ ≡− r +
r−ρ
γ .
Appendix A presents a proof.
Condition (5) shows that participation decisions depend upon a woman’s potential
market earnings, yF
is; her household’s lifetime resources, Yi0;h o u s e h o l ds i z e ,Nis;a n d
household age, s. Ceteris paribus, labor—force participation is more attractive for a woman
with high potential market earnings, yF
is, and less attractive for a woman whose household’s
lifetime earnings, Yi0, are high. Female participation is less attractive at ages when a
household is large relative to its average size. In other words, if a household has many
children at home, the wife has strong incentives to remain at home as well. (If household
size is unchanged over the life cycle, on the other hand, then Nis drops out of (5).)
Finally, suppose that the market interest rate exceeds the subjective discount rate
(i.e., suppose that r>ρ). In this case, (5) shows that a woman’s participation in the labor
market is less likely for older households – provided earnings growth levels oﬀ beyond some
age. Consumption growth reduces the marginal utility of more dollars to spend; however,
gains from more time at home are proportionate, in our framework, to resources regardless
1 See the discussion in Laitner and Silverman [2005, 2007].
2 See, for instance, Hurd and Rohwedder [2003], Laitner and Silverman [2005, 2007],
and Aguiar and Hurst [2005].
4of the latter’s level – and they are, in that sense, immune to diminishing returns. An
analogous argument in Section 6 provides a story for household retirement.
3. Estimation Strategy
The model presented and analyzed in Section 2 can predict the labor—force participa-
tion of a woman in a given household at all ages. To generate such predictions from the
model, we require parameter values for λ and γ, as well as household—level data on the
present value of lifetime earnings, Yi0; the time path of female earnings, yF
is; and house-
hold size, Nis. We seek to obtain parameter values with the following estimation strategy.
For a prospective vector of parameters   θ, which is common to all households, we use the
model and household—level data to predict the labor—force participation proﬁle for each
household. Then we compare the prediction with observed female behavior in the data.
Finally, we adjust the prospective parameter vector   θ to minimize the diﬀerence between
predicted and observed participation proﬁles.
Predicted Participation Proﬁles.L e t Di denote the data on household i. The data con-
sists of two numbers, Si and Ri, which specify a household’s starting and retirement ages,
and three functions of the household’s age s,n a m e l y ,Nis, yM
is ,a n dyF
is,w h i c hs p e c i f y ,
respectively, the household’s size proﬁle, male earnings, and female earnings. We calibrate
values for ρ, r, and male and female lifespans, which are common to all households, and
we treat   θ as the vector of parameters to be estimated. Given Di and   θ, the optimal labor—
force participation condition (see (5)) generates a predicted participation proﬁle  ps(Di ,   θ)
for each household:
 ps(Di ,   θ) ≡ χ
D
yF
is − Nis ·
JY (pis |D i ,   θ)
















is + pis · yF
is)ds, (7)
J(pis |D i ,   θ) ≡
8 Ti
Si
eσ·s · Nis · [λ(s,p is)]
1−γ
γ ds, (8)
and χ(.) is an indicator function.
Calibrating Λ. We calibrate Λ as follows. Let ωi be the sample weight for household i in













ωi · piRi .
In our model, if a husband and wife retire together, their household’s consumption should





















γ · (1 − pR). (9)
We set the left—hand side of (9) from an external source: Laitner and Silverman [2007] use
Consumer Expenditure Survey data to measure the average drop in household consumption
at retirement and ﬁnd a fraction of about 0.20. Using, say, ∆R =0 .20, we can solve (9)
for Λ:
Λ(Di ,   θ, ∆R)=
D ∆R





This provides our calibration of Λ.
Regression. Rather than searching for parameters to match each household’s exact path of
female labor—market participation, this paper focuses on the total length of each woman’s
market career. In other words, we choose parameters to match average female labor—force
participation. Let
 τ(Di ,   θ) ≡
8 T
Si
 ps(Di ,   θ)ds. (11)
Then  τ(Di ,   θ) is the total predicted length of all labor—force participation spells for house-
hold i. Note that since our model is set in continuous time,  τ(.) is a continuous variable






Then our regression model is
τi =  τ(Di ,   θ)+ i , (12)
6where  i is an iid random error. We estimate   θ from (12) using nonlinear least squares
(NLLS).
We think of  i as arising in (12) from measurement error. Our participation data
has observations at annual frequency, yet true participation spells may start or end in the
m i d d l eo fay e a r .W ed e v i s ea ni m p u t a t i o np r o cedure for partial years of work below. The
 i in (12) reﬂects measurement errors that remain.
One could think of identiﬁcation for λ as coming from cross—sectional variation in
female labor—force participation for households of diﬀerent sizes, diﬀerent total lifetime
earnings, and diﬀerent female earnings. One could think of identiﬁcation for γ as coming
from each household’s changing participation with age.
This paper calculates  τ(Di ,   θ) for the right—hand side of (12) as follows. Suppose, as
above, that  i reﬂects measurement errors in pis, s ∈ [Si ,R i], stemming from limitations
of our data set. Our observation of lifetime earnings, Yi0, does not have this error –
annual observations on male or female earnings automatically reﬂect actual months (and
hours) of employment. If one is willing to overlook possible errors in J(.)f r o mu s i n gt h e
data on pis,o n ec a nc o m p u t e τi given Di, Yi0,a n da n yp r o s p e c t i v e  θ. Maintaining Di and
Yi0, one can then adjust   θ to minimize the sum of squared errors in the regression. That
is the technique that this paper uses. It leads to the results in Table 1 of Section 5.
Future drafts will recognize more fully the fact that λis depends on pis. For given
(Di ,Y i0 ,   θ)a n dap r o s p e c t i v eJi (as in (8)), we can use (5) to generate pis all s and,
hence, a new Ji,s a y ,J∗
i .T h i sd e ﬁnes a mapping ψ(.):
J∗
i = ψ(Ji , Di ,Y i0 ,   θ).
We need to ﬁnd a ﬁxed point, say, JFP
i = JFP(Di ,Y i0 ,   θ), of the new mapping:
JFP
i = ψ(JFP
i , Di ,   θ).
Then we should use this ﬁxed point in (6) and (11) to generate
 τ
D
JFP(Di ,Y i0 ,   θ), Di ,   θ
i
.
This will be our next step.
4. Data
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to construct a compre-
hensive measure of household lifetime earnings and the earning proﬁles of women. To
implement our empirical strategy, we also require data on age of male retirement and
number of equivalent adults per household at each age. This section discusses our data set
in detail, and Figures 1-2 present quantitative summary information.
We use the original survey cohort from the HRS, consisting of households in which
the respondent is 51-61 in 1992 (Juster and Suzman [1995]). We restrict our attention to
married couples that meet the following conditions: (1) each spouse has only been married
once, (2) the couple has a complete earnings record (see below), (3) the birth dates for all
7children in the household are available in the data set, and (4) both spouses have retired
by 2002. Appendix B discusses other sample restrictions that we employ.
As a matter of deﬁnition, we associate the age of a household with that of the adult
male. Set SM
i =m a x {18, years education + 6} for the male, and similarly deﬁne SF
i
for the female. Converting both to the male’s age, the household’s starting age is the
minimum of the two. An individual is retired if he/she reports that status – though
we assume that both spouses are retired when the male is. Our model abstracts from
uncertainty about lifespan. For every household, we assume that the man lives to age 76
and the woman lives to age 80. These calibrations together with the spousal age diﬀerence
imply a household—speciﬁce n d i n ga g eTi.
We aggregate family members into a single index of “equivalent adults.” Before the
household is married, the man and the woman live apart and, after age SM
i the male
contributes 1 to the household’s equivalent adult total, and after age SF
i the female con-
tributes 1 as well. Once the couple marries, prior to its ﬁrst child the number of household
equivalent adults is 1.5. Each child, to a maximum of 2 in any given year, counts 0.5 in the
household equivalent adult total. Upon the death of one spouse, the household’s number
of equivalent adults declines from 1.5 to 1.0 (assuming no remaining children at home).
Total lifetime resources, Yi0, for household i i st h ep r e s e n tv a l u ea ta g e0o fm a l ea n d
female lifetime earnings. Future work will compute net—of—tax earnings (including federal
income taxes and payroll taxes) and add Social Security and Medicare beneﬁts.
We have annual Social Security earnings histories for both men and women in our
sample. The HRS supplies survey data (and work hours) for 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000,
and 2002. Prior to 1981, the Social Security histories are right censored at the OASDI
maximum taxable amount; after 1981, earnings are censored at $100,000, 250,000, and
500,000 (to protect respondent conﬁdentiality). We replace right—censored amounts with
imputations from an earnings dynamic equation (see House, Laitner, Stolyarov [2007]).
From the same equation, we impute all missing male earnings ﬁgures. These steps implicitly
assume that males participate full time in the labor market for all ages SM
i to Ri.
We use a separate earnings dynamics equation to impute right—censored female earn-
ings. We make an eﬀort to impute non—FICA earnings from the equation for spans in
w h i c ht h ew o m a nr e p o r t su n c o v e r e dj o b s . 3 For all other years, we use reported female
earnings, which can be 0.
Because many women have spells of non—participation in the labor force, we worry
about years that bracket withdrawal from the market. In other words, we worry about
setting pis = 1 for all years with any female earnings. We make the following correction.
If a bracketing age, say, s, is preceded or followed by two or more non—bracketed ages, we
derive an extrapolated earnings ﬁgure, say,  yF
is, from the two nearest non—bracketed ages.
If the extrapolation is larger than observed earnings, yF
is,w es e tpis = yF
is/ yF
is.
Another complication is that our model requires estimates of yF
is for ages s in which a
woman does not participate in the labor market. We obtain estimates for such ages using
3 Speciﬁcally, we use survey information on number of years with non—FICA earnings
and the time interval for the latter. We assume the non—FICA earnings occur in an
unbroken sequence. In our estimation below, we position the sequence to minimize the
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Figure 2. Distribution of participation spans cubic interpolations (or extrapolations) from the nearest ages with participation.
Finally, we set the time preference parameter ρ =0 .02, and we assume a constant
net—of—tax interest rate of r =0 .0442 per year (e.g., Laitner and Silverman [2007]).
Summary Statistics. We present summary information on our sample in ﬁgures that fol-
low.
Figure 1 shows the sample average number of equivalent adults, Nis, and the sample
average female labor—force participation, pis. Almost all households in the sample have at
least 2 children living with them at some point. The smooth hump—shaped proﬁle of the
average number of adult equivalents reﬂects heterogeneity in the timing of births and the
timing of children’s departure from the household. The sudden drop in household size at
76 reﬂects male mortality. There is no equivalently sharp drop at age 80 when women die
because the graph is plotted against household age. Household age, by deﬁnition, equals
the age of the adult male; thus, household age for female mortality varies with the age
diﬀerence of spouses.
The life—cycle female labor—force participation pattern exhibits two peaks. The early
peak (at male age 23) corresponds to women ﬁnishing their education and working prior
to bearing children. The second, larger peak corresponds to mothers of grown children
returning to work. Female labor—force participation drops steeply at retirement age.
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of households by the length of female lifetime labor—
force participation. Almost 7 percent of women in the sample never worked in the market
at all – hence the peak at participation spans of less than 5 years. Another slightly larger
peak is at 30-35 total years in the labor force, which corresponds to participating almost
without interruption.
5. Results
We estimate regression equation (12) with non—linear least squares for three diﬀerent
values for the drop in household consumption at retirement: a 10 percent drop, a 15
percent drop, and a 20 percent drop. In each case, we calculate a corresponding value of
Λ from (10), as explained in Section 3. (The drop in consumption at retirement is ∆R in
the notation of Section 3.) Table 1 presents results.
In Table 1, the point estimates of λ center around 1.115 and are not sensitive to the
chosen value of ∆R. The implied value of Λ, on the other hand, does (not surprisingly) co—
vary strongly with the size of the drop in consumption at retirement. The point estimate
of γ is roughly 4.0, which is similar to a number of other estimates in the literature (see,
for example, the discussion in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987]), but which is higher than
the value estimated in Laitner and Silverman [2007]. The standard errors are somewhat
sensitive to the method that we use to construct potential female earnings, although the
point estimates are not.
Section 3 describes the exact computations leading to the results in Table 1. It also
indicates more sophisticated steps that we intend to use for additional estimates in the
future.
9Table 1. Parameter Estimates
Health and Retirement Study Data 1992-2002a
Assumed Consumption Drop at Retirement:b ∆R =
Parameter
10 percent 15 percent 20 percent
γ 4.4511 4.0552 3.8487
(S.E.) ( 0.0522) (0.0527) ( 0.0728)
λ 1.1156 1.1140 1.1155
(S.E.) ( 0.0041) ( 0.0040) ( 0.0039)
Summary Statistics
R2 0.6682 0.6688 0.6685
Observations 441 441 441
Addendum: Derived Parameter Values
Λ 1.2148 1.3216 1.4411
λ
γ−1
γ 1.0885 1.0847 1.0842
Λ/λ 1.0889 1.1864 1.2912
a. See text.
b. See text.
10Interpretation. The point estimates and equation (3) imply that household expenditure
per adult equivalent should rise by a factor λ
γ−1
γ when a woman joins the labor force. Her
household compensates for its loss of services (from her home production and leisure) with
higher expenditure. Table 1 implies the size of this compensation is roughly 8 percent of
household spending on consumption. The ratio Λ/λ in Table 1 measures the additional
value of consumption services that the household enjoys from leisure in retirement.
Figure 3 plots the sample average of household earnings and the sample average
consumption—expenditure proﬁle implied by our parameter estimates when the drop of
household consumption at retirement is 20 percent. Again, the smoothness of both series
is a consequence of aggregation over the heterogeneous households in our sample. The
hump in the household consumption proﬁle corresponds to the presence of minor children
in the household. The average consumption proﬁle is not very sensitive to λ –p e r h a p s
because most changes in female labor—force participation occur after children leave home
s ot h a tt h ei m p a c to faj u m pi nλ on total household consumption is often mitigated by
small household size at the time of the change.
As in Figure 1, Figure 3 reveals a sharp drop in consumption expenditure at age 76.
This follows from our assumption that men die at this age. Although adding uncertainty
about lifespan would complicate the picture, mortality would still cause steep declines at
the right—hand side of Figure 3.
6. Extension: Optimal Retirement
Although analysis so far treats retirement age as exogenous to families, our model also
has implications for optimal retirement – recall Section 2. There are at least two reasons to
consider optimal retirement decisions. First, one would expect households simultaneously
to choose female participation, life—cycle consumption trajectories, and retirement age.
Thus, modeling optimal retirement age should yield additional insights on other life—cycle
choices. Second, if our analysis yields more ﬁrst—order conditions for optimal behavior, we
should have more conditions for estimating parameters. This section brieﬂy considers how
one could incorporate optimal retirement age into our framework and expand the scope of
our regression analysis to include estimation of Λ.
R e t u r n i n gt oo p t i m i z a t i o np roblem (1) and analyzing the ﬁrst—order condition for
optimal R,w eh a v e
Proposition 3. If household i chooses its optimal retirement age R = Ri,t h e nR satisﬁes
yiR = NiR ·
J Yi0
$ Ti















where σ ≡− r +
r−ρ
γ and yis ≡ yM
is + yF
is.

















Figure 3. Sample average household income and consumption profiles, 1984 dollars. Equation (13) balances forgone earnings against utility gains from retirement. An
intuitive argument is as follows. Suppose that both spouses work prior to R and then








So, c is consumption just prior to retirement – in other words, cR−0 = c. Retirement at
age R entails loss of earnings ﬂow yR. Marginal utility per equivalent adult is
[NR]γ · [cR−0]−γ .




· [NR]γ · c−γ . (14)












γ · Λ]1−γ − c1−γo
. (15)
The second component of gain emerges because, as we have noted above, consumption
after retirement will be smaller (greater) than c if γ > 1( γ < 1). The dollar value of the
ﬂow saving for the household is
NR · c · (1 − Λ
1−γ
γ ).
The dollar ﬂow per equivalent adult is the same divided by NR. In utility terms, the
second component then is
NR · c
NR
· (1 − Λ
γ−1
γ ) · [NR]γ · c−γ . (16)
At the optimal retirement age R, (14) should equal (15) plus (16). Noting that in this case
λiR = 1, such equality yields (13).
T h ea r g u m e n ti sa l m o s tt h es a m ei ft h eh o u sehold’s wife has stopped working prior
to R.T h e nλiR = λ.L e tc be as above, and let
C ≡ c · λ
1−γ
γ .
T h ea n a l o g u eo f( 1 4 )i s
12yR
NR
· [NR]γ · [C · λ]−γ · λ =
yR
NR
· [NR]γ · λ1−γ · C−γ =
yR
NR
· [NR]γ · c−γ . (17)


















γ ) · [NR]γ · c−γ . (19)
Equation (13) emerges if we equate (17) with the sum of (18) and (19).
Future work will solve (13) as we solved (11) in Section 3, yielding
 R(Di ,   θ)
with
  θ ≡ (λ, γ , Λ).
We will then estimate (12) and
Ri =  R(Di ,   θ)+ηi (20)
as a system.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper’s model depicts the labor—force participation trajectory for married women
over their life cycle. The model assumes that a household’s productivity in utilizing con-
sumption drops when the husband and/or wife have fewer hours per week at home. Earn-
ings compensate for lost time at home. If her market compensation is too low, a woman
will choose not to work. The model predicts that labor—force participation will be greatest
for women with high wages and/or relatively few children. When a household retires, the
household’s productivity in using consumption rises still further.
We use the model, together with micro—level data available from the HRS on house-
hold earnings and demographic characteristics, to estimate key parameters of the model.
Our estimates predict that a household’s consumption should rise roughly 8-10 percent to
compensate for lost home production when women enter the labor market. This is 40-50
percent of the decline other studies predict when a household retires completely. In a sense,
therefore, we ﬁnd that married women’s labor—force participation disrupts a household’s
eﬃciency at home production about 40-50 percent as much as having a retired household
return to work would.
We have outlined how we expect to extend the analysis to consider women’s labor—
force participation and household retirement jointly. Another extension that we expect to
13pursue will make a woman’s productivity at home dependent on her number of children
and their ages. We expect the model then to complement existing work on the value of
women’s home production (see, for example, House et al. [2007], Benhabib et al. [1991],
and Rupert et al. [2000]) and the cost of raising children.
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16Appendix A: Proofs of the Propositions
This appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 1 Let (cis,p is,R i) be the optimal solution to the household problem. Let Yis be the present
















where σ = −r +
r−ρ
γ .
Proof: Let μt be the co-state variable on the budget constraint. Fix an arbitrary participation proﬁle pis.









= μis = μi0e−rs,a l ls ≤ T ⇐⇒
Let Yis b et h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo fl i f e t i m ee a r n i n g so fh o u s e h o l di measured at age s, so that for any s,
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where σ = −r +
r−ρ
γ .
Proof: Suppose the optimal value function V (t,a) is known and t<R . Represent the household problem
as a discrete choice problem.
V (t,a)=m a x{V1 (t,a),V 0 (t,a)}
where








dt + V (t + dt,a + da1)
¶
























are the value functions and the laws of motion for assets that correspond to pt =1and pt =0respectively.
































































































































































































































V (t,a)=m a x{VW (t,a),V R (t,a)}
where








dt + V (t + dt,a + daW)
¶








dt + V (t + dt,a + daR)
¶
daW =( ra+ yt − ct)dt,
18daR =( ra− ct)dt
are the value functions and the laws of motion for assets that correspond to work and retirement, respectively.






































































































If R is the optimal retirement age, then at the moment of retirement, the household must be indiﬀerent
between retiring and continuing to work



























Substituting μt for ∂V
∂a in the above expression and using (11) gives (8).
19Appendix B: Data
This section presents a detailed description and construction details for our data inputs.
Sample Criteria. We use the original survey cohort from the HRS, consisting of households in which
the respondent is age 51-61 in 1992 (Juster and Suzman 1995). Our analysis focuses on married couples.
The survey waves 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 have 4663 married couples.2 Because wealth
at retirement may be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by marriage history (e.g. Guner and Knowles 2004), we limit
attention to couples in which each spouse has been married only once. This reduces the sample to 3046
households. The number of couples with single—marriage spouses for which we can construct lifetime earnings
for both spouses is 1582 (see below). We require birth dates for all children, which further limits the sample
to 1581 households. We include in our analysis only those household observations for which both the man
and the woman are retired by 2002 (see below how the retirement age for the household is constructed), so
their full earnings history is realized and observed.
We further restrict the sample as follows. As a protection against coding errors, we exclude any household
observation with negative HRS net worth or comprehensive net worth above $5 million. We exclude males
who are disabled when they retire, males who retire but later return to work, males who retire before age 56
or after age 68, couples with age diﬀerence exceeding 6 years, and males or females less than 4 years short
of the mean age of death (74 and 80, respectively). After restricting the sample to households in which both
spouses are retired and making the other adjustments, our ﬁnal sample has 441 households.
Household starting age and retirement age We deﬁne the age of the household to be the age of
the adult male. The household begins when either the man or the woman becomes independent. We deﬁne
independence as the maximum of age 18 or the individual’s years of education plus 6. Prior to marriage, the
man and the woman live apart and thus each contribute 1 to the household’s equivalent adult total. Once
they marry, prior to their ﬁrst child, the number of household equivalents is 1.5. Formally, let SM
i be the
maximum of 18 and the adult male’s years of education plus 6, let SF
i b et h es a m ef o rt h ea d u l tf e m a l e ,a n d
let Di be the female’s birth date minus the male’s. The household begins at age Si with
Si =m i n{SM
i ,S F
i + Di}.
(Note that Di serves only to restate the age of the household in terms of the man’s age.)
Our deﬁnition of “retirement” is as follows. The HRS asks individuals whether they are retired; it
separately asks whether their retirement status is fully retired, partly retired, or not retired. In our analysis,
an individual is retired if he (or she) answers yes to the ﬁrst question, lists his/her retirement status as fully
retired, or works less than 500 hours per year and does not list his/her retirement status as not retired. We
exclude from the sample males who never worked. Our procedure classiﬁes a household as retired when the
male stops work.
Household size Our sample includes data from households with diﬀering numbers of children and diﬀering
birth dates for children, age of marriage, etc. To incorporate this heterogeneity, we aggregate family members
into a single index of “equivalent adults.” Speciﬁcally, for household i at (male) age s,l e tt h en u m b e ro f
equivalent adults Nis be
Nis = nA
is + nS
is · αS + nC
is · αC , (19)
where is nA
is = {0,1,2} is the number of non-spouse adults in the household, nS
is = {0,1} is the number of
spouses and nC
is = {0,1,2} is the number of children in the household. The number of non-spouse adults is
number non-spouse adults nA
is is 0 until male or female begins work; 1 when male or female begins work; 2
when both are working but they have not yet married; 1 after they marry; 1 until both die - then 0. The
number of spouses nS
is is 1 between the age of marriage and the death of the ﬁrst spouse, and is 0 otherwise.
nC
is is number of children age 0-20 in household at current male age, subject to a maximum of 2.
Male earnings For both men and women, the HRS provides annual earnings (as well as market hours) in
each survey wave. If an HRS participant signs a permission waiver, we also have his or her Social Security
Administration (SSA) annual—earnings history for the years 1951-91.3
2Unless otherwise noted, all HRS data is in public—use ﬁles – see http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/.
3Access to this data is more restricted than the HRS survey data. See http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/.
20The SSA earning histories are a unique resource. They are not, however, without disadvantages that
complicate analysis. (i) The Social Security System does not cover all jobs – the linked data provide no
information on non-FICA employment. (ii) SSA earnings data are right—censored in some cases because they
only track earnings up to the year’s statutory maximum income level subject to the Social Security tax.4
(iii) Social Security records do not include work hours or wage rates.
The earnings of individuals who have non-FICA jobs or who do have FICA jobs, but earn above the
statutory maximum, need to be imputed. The imputation methodology is described in House, Laitner and
Stolyarov (2007).
Female earnings As with male earnings, female earnings from the non-FICA jobs and those above the
Social Security cap need to be imputed. In addition, our analysis requires female earnings (actual or poten-
tial) at every age, regardless of her participation decision. The HRS data only has actual earnings during
participation years, so the potential earnings during non-participation spans need to be imputed as well.
The imputation methodology is similar to that for males (see House, Laitner and Stolyarov, 2007), except in
the case of female earnings we control for the fact that some earnings observations may come from part-time
work.
Female participation profile The female participation proﬁle is constructed from the participation data
for FICA and non-FICA jobs that have diﬀerent level of detail on participation. For FICA jobs, participation
pFICA
is = {0,1} is observed in each year. However, we suspect that years that bracket participation spells
might correspond to fractional paticipation 0 <p is < 1, and these fractions need to be imputed to construct
the female participation proﬁle. The imputation is done as follows. Let Iil denote the participartion spell
number l ≥ 1 for household i,deﬁned as a set of consecutive years where pis =1 . The start of participation
spell is tS
il =m i nIil, and the end is tE
il =m a xIil.E a r n i n g si ny e a r stS
il and tE
il may be well below the earnings
for other years in the participation spell, which we think indicate fractional participation. Consequently, we














where f (·) can vary with extrapolation method. If the extrapolated earnings are above actual, we interpret
this as fractional participation. Formally,
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,a l ll ≥ 1
pFICA
is ,a l l o t h e r s .
For non-FICA jobs, the only information in the survey is the number of years τNF worked in a non-
FICA job and the interval of years INF when this employment occurred. We assume that all τNF years of
employment occurred in one spell and "locate" this spell in the interval INF in such a way as to minimize
the distance |τi − ˆ τi| (note that both τi and ˆ τi depend on where the non-FICA participation spell occurs).
The outcome of this minimization is a non-FICA participation proﬁle p00
is.
Finally, we set
pis =m a x{p0
is,p 00
is},a l ls



















4The SSA also provides linked W2 tax reports annually for1980-91. Although the W2 records are right—censored for conﬁ-
dentiality, the upper limit is substantially higher than the Social Security earnings cap – $125,000 for earnings under $250,000;
$250,000 for earnings under $500,000, and $500,000 for earnings above that amount. In practice, we assume right—censoring at
$125,000 for all W2 amounts at or above $125,000. The W2 amounts include non—FICA earnings – and separately identify the
latter. They omit some tax deferred pension amounts. Although they also omit self—employment earnings, they identify Social
Security measures of the latter. In practice, an individual may have multiple jobs, and we add the corresponding W2 amounts.
21This treatment implicitly assumes that in a course of one year a woman can hold either a FICA job or a
non-FICA job, but not both. If a woman does not participate, her potential earnings are taken from the
earnings dynamics equation.
22